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Introduction
This briefing paper is designed to inform discussion 
regarding the need and options for regulatory alignment 
on the island of Ireland in the context of Brexit and, in 
particular, the UK-EU Joint Report of 8 December 2017. 
It first discusses key principles and practices regarding the 
regulatory context for cross-border trade and cooperation 
on the island of Ireland (Section I). 
It then sets out the implications of the commitments of the 
UK and the EU stated in the Joint Report, centring on the 
avoidance of a hard border and the protection of the 1998 
Agreement (Section II).
Section I. The Regulatory Context: 
Principles and Practices
1. What Makes the Irish Border ‘Frictionless and 
Seamless’ 
1.1 The Irish border is currently a comparatively 
frictionless border (albeit not an entirely open one) due 
to four broad legal and policy frameworks shared by the 
UK and Ireland: the Common Travel Area (CTA), the EU 
Customs Union, the EU Single Market, and the 1998 Belfast 
‘Good Friday’ Agreement. 
1.2  The Common Travel Area allows for British 
and Irish citizens to have a privileged position in the 
immigration regimes of, respectively, the Irish and UK 
states. This includes rights with regard to residence, work 
and social welfare. That said, the context for movement 
of labour and for rights provided by the CTA is far less 
comprehensive than that provided for by EU membership. 
The CTA does not relate to trade, to customs, to 
regulations on the movement of goods, services or capital, 
or to the 1998 Agreement. It would benefit from formal 
codification and further embedding in UK and Irish law to 
see Irish citizens in the UK enjoy protected status above 
(or, for British citizens in Ireland, equivalent to) that of 
other EU citizens after Brexit.
1.3. The Single Market enables free movement of 
people/labour, capital and services as well as goods. It is 
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incomplete (see current work on tax harmonisation). It 
is aimed at making borders as frictionless as possible for 
economic growth and citizens’ mobility, thus it necessarily 
includes detailed legislation (e.g. on minimum product 
standards) and accompanying legal enforcement through 
(ultimately) the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
1.4. The Customs Union complements the tariff and 
quota-free movement of goods between states with a 
common external tariff on the import/export of goods 
from/to third countries. Trade between members of a 
customs union and those outside it requires customs 
controls. Those controls include applying tariffs and quotas 
to goods, ensuring that the goods are permitted to enter 
and be traded (‘rules of origin’), and vital checks for the 
purposes of environmental protection, public policy and 
security, and the safety and health of humans, animals and 
plants.
1.5. The 1998 Agreement is an international treaty 
between two states. The UK and Irish governments are 
bound in international law to implement the terms of this 
Agreement. It has been drafted, agreed and implemented 
in a context of shared UK and Irish membership of the 
EU and presumed continuity of the same. The practical 
implementation of the Agreement in several areas of 
cross-border cooperation (see below) relies on common 
regulatory regimes. Joint EU membership has also meant 
commonality between the UK and Ireland in other policy 
areas with cross-border relevance, such as police and 
judicial cooperation through certain opt-ins to the second 
generation Schengen Information System.
2. Regulatory Divergence
2.1. Differences in regulation between states act as an 
inhibitor to cross-border trade and cooperation in several 
ways. 
2.2. Where there is regulatory divergence, businesses 
and stakeholders wishing to operate across a border need 
to: 
• be aware of the regulatory requirements in 
both jurisdictions; 
• comply with two different sets of rules; and 
• demonstrate compliance with those rules.
2.3. European integration has had the effect of 
reducing regulatory divergence across the EU28 and 
the wider European Economic Area (EEA) through the 
development of a shared EU-level body of laws and 
regulations, the acquis communautaire.
2.4. The question that needs to be addressed in 
Phase 2 of the Brexit negotiations is how trade and 
cooperation across the Irish border – which has been 
facilitated by the acquis – will continue post-Brexit. Trade 
and cooperation with the EU may be hindered not only 
by dint of the UK leaving the Customs Union and the 
Single Market; it will become increasingly difficult as the 
UK replaces the acquis with domestic legislation that 
leads to regulatory divergence from the EU. 
3. Regulatory Alignment
3.1. The UK-EU Joint Report of 8 December 2017 
offers three post-Brexit scenarios for regulating trade and 
cooperation across the Irish border:
• a UK-EU comprehensive trade deal;
• ‘agreed solutions’ for Northern Ireland/
Ireland in particular; 
• ‘full [regulatory] alignment’ of the UK to the 
EU.
3.2. Paragraph 49 of the Joint Report states that, 
if there are no ‘agreed solutions’ for Northern Ireland, 
‘the United Kingdom will maintain full alignment with 
those rules of the Internal Market and the Customs 
Union which, now or in the future, support North-South 
cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection 
of the 1998 Agreement’. 
3.3. ‘Full’ alignment would mean that the effects 
of UK domestic regulation would need to be the same 
as those of EU regulation in the relevant areas. The 
identification of these relevant areas – i.e. the rules of 
the Internal Market and Customs Union which (currently 
or potentially) support the three priorities noted in 
Paragraph 49 – has yet to be completed. 
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3.4. The purpose of regulatory alignment is to 
minimise barriers and obstacles to trade and cooperation. 
Regulatory alignment is a well-established practice in EU 
relations with non-member states and is an increasingly 
prominent feature of trading arrangements with those 
states. In such examples, the market access opportunities 
and trade interdependencies are motivating factors in the 
third country’s willingness to align with the EU.
3.5. Regulatory alignment is important beyond the 
movement of goods. For example, it enables services to be 
provided across a border and facilitates businesses’ right 
of establishment beyond the ‘home’ state. Services tend to 
be highly regulated and many cross-border services have 
relied on a context of regulatory alignment in the EU.
3.6. The importance of regulatory alignment for 
facilitating cross-border cooperation was reflected in the 
results of the joint UK-EU mapping exercise (conducted 
in Autumn 2017). This identified 142 areas in which 
cooperation across the Irish border has developed as a 
result of the implementation of the 1998 Agreement. 
These range from an all-island sanitary and phyto-sanitary 
regime (for animal health and welfare) and the single 
electricity market, to the cross-border rail service, mobile 
phone roaming and emergency healthcare planning 
and provision. They bring direct benefit to Northern 
Ireland and much of this cooperation relies on regulatory 
alignment between the UK and Ireland. 
3.7. There appear to be differences in the way London 
and Brussels are interpreting ‘regulatory alignment’ and 
the scope of regulation required to meet UK commitments 
in the Joint Report. The EU understands this term to mean 
that, even if there is a difference in the rules applied by 
the country concerned, the outcome is the same as if 
they were in the EU. The UK government’s interpretation 
appears to be one that emphasises sovereignty and 
flexibility in the rules applied, and thus potentially 
underestimates the EU’s expectations of the degree of 
convergence and the scope of areas covered. 
3.8. Regulatory alignment does not necessarily mean 
identical rules but it must result in the same outcome. 
Such convergence in outcomes can occur through a 
variety of mechanisms including legislative approximation, 
autonomous adaptation and legal harmonization.   
3.9. The concept of regulatory alignment as applied by 
the EU is one that covers: 
• the rules themselves; 
• the means of assessing conformity to them; 
• the need for cooperation and information-
sharing across the border in order to uphold 
them;  and
• a dispute-settlement mechanism.
This means that the post-Brexit UK-EU relationship must 
entail legal and institutional mechanisms to cover all these 
functions in relation to Ireland/Northern Ireland. 
4. The Significance of a Customs Border
4.1. In the absence of a customs union with the EU, 
there will be a need for customs controls on the Irish 
border. This is because countries on either side of a 
customs union boundary have to manage and control for 
the differences in customs regimes, including in the goods 
permitted entry, and in the tariffs/quotas applied.
4.2. All goods crossing a customs border need to be 
declared and cleared for exit and entry. Electronic and pre-
clearance systems can work (e.g. for Authorised Economic 
Operators) as a means of speeding up this process, but 
they still entail considerable resources, infrastructure 
and [the capacity for] physical inspections. A customs 
border is always a ‘hard’ border to the extent that it 
requires demonstrated/declared conformity with – and 
enforcement of – procedures for the movement of goods 
across it. Both demonstrating and enforcing compliance 
with customs procedures requires infrastructure and 
resources. 
4.3. Under World Trade Organization (WTO) rules 
(Agreement on Trade Facilitation), each state must enforce 
its customs border. It is not a matter of choice or unilateral 
action.
4.4. Not to impose customs controls – or to impose 
them ineffectively – would mean the creation of huge 
opportunities for criminal activity (i.e. smuggling of 
counterfeit, restricted, or prohibited goods). This would 
reduce public revenue collection and undermine legally-
compliant businesses. Ineffectual enforcement of controls 
along the Irish border would mean it would become a 
Under World Trade Organization 
(WTO) rules (Agreement on Trade 
Facilitation), each state must 
enforce its customs border. It is not 
a matter of choice or unilateral 
action.
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renowned loophole for illegal imports into both the UK and 
the EU markets, with tangible consequences for revenue 
collection, legitimate business and consumer safety. 
4.5. All technological means of customs border 
enforcement require resources, infrastructure and 
preparation to implement. They do not substitute for the 
need for checks and inspections but merely aid efficiency 
in crossing the border legitimately and in identifying 
potential breaches of compliance or false declarations. 
They do not avert a ‘hard’ border but help minimise time 
delays in crossing it. 
4.6. Evidence from other examples shows that even the 
most technologically-advanced means of customs border 
management rely on regulatory alignment, close cross-
border cooperation and effective capacity for inspections 
and enforcement in order to minimise disruption to trade.
5. Why a UK-EU Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Agreement is Insufficient
5.1. A free trade agreement removes tariffs and quotas 
on goods traded by the signatories; some free trade 
agreements also facilitate the movement of services in 
some areas. A free trade agreement provides for far less 
than either a customs union (which includes a common 
external tariff and a common commercial policy) or a 
single market (which covers the free movement of goods, 
people, services and capital). A free trade agreement also 
does not provide the regulatory context for either the 
type or extent of cooperation either institutionalised or 
provided for in the 1998 Agreement. 
5.2. Even with a deep and comprehensive UK-EU free 
trade agreement, border controls of some sort will be 
needed (e.g. to check regulatory compliance and for rules 
of origin checks). There would also be barriers to cross-
border cooperation and movement in some areas, for the 
reasons already given (see 1 and 2 above).
5.3. Free trade agreements concluded by the EU 
rarely provide for free trade in agricultural products or 
free movement of services; they also tend not to cover 
regulatory alignment in important sectors (e.g. health, 
environment) that are the focus of much of the cross-
border cooperation that currently occurs on the island of 
Ireland.
A free trade agreement does 
not provide the regulatory 
context for either the type or 
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Section II. Options
6. Scope for the Future Deal
6.1. It is quite clear that the EU is expecting the UK to 
choose a future trade relationship that is broadly along the 
lines of either membership of the Single Market (e.g. the 
‘Norway’ option) or a comprehensive free trade agreement 
(e.g. the ‘Canada’ option). Although the final treaty would 
be of course unique, there is very limited prospect of a 
highly ‘bespoke’ deal for the UK that differs significantly 
from any existing option. 
6.2. The Joint Report’s recognition of the unique 
situation of Northern Ireland should not be interpreted 
as scope for an ‘à la carte’ deal for the UK. The EU has 
been consistent in saying that ‘specific solutions’ are only 
available to meet ‘the unique situation of the island of 
Ireland’. 
6.3. There is also very limited prospect for a sector-by-
sector approach to finding a UK-wide deal that avoids a 
hard Irish border. Under WTO rules, free trade agreements 
must cover substantially all trade and the EU has been 
consistent in stating that it will not offer sector-specific 
deals. 
6.4. Even if the UK were able to negotiate a situation 
in which regulatory alignment were partial (e.g. limited to 
particular areas), there would still be a need for controls 
to check whether the goods crossing the border were 
covered by the alignment or not.
6.5. The willingness on the part of the EU to find 
‘flexible and imaginative’ solutions for Northern Ireland 
centres on shared UK and EU support for the peace 
process and upholding the 1998 Agreement. Bespoke 
arrangements for Northern Ireland may therefore be 
accepted. That said, the stated preference on both sides 
is for a UK-wide solution that avoids a hard border on the 
island of Ireland.  
7. UK Commitments in the Joint Report
7.1. In the Joint Report the UK government recalls its 
commitments to:
• ‘protecting the operation of the 1998 
Agreement, including its subsequent 
implementation agreements and 
arrangements, and to the effective operation 
of each of the institutions and bodies 
established under them’ (paragraph 43); 
• ‘the avoidance of a hard border, including any 
physical infrastructure or related checks and 
controls’ (paragraph 43);
• ‘preserving the integrity of [the UK] internal 
market and Northern Ireland’s place within it’ 
(paragraph 45). 
7.2. The UK government notes that it remains 
committed to:
• protecting and supporting continued 
North-South and East-West cooperation 
across the full range of political, economic, 
security, societal and agricultural contexts 
and frameworks of cooperation, including 
the continued operation of the North-South 
implementation bodies’ (paragraph 48);
• ‘protecting North-South cooperation and 
to its guarantee of avoiding a hard border’ 
(paragraph 49).
7.3. In the Joint Report the UK also commits to:
• ‘ensuring that no diminution of rights is 
caused by its departure from the European 
Union, including in the area of protection 
against forms of discrimination enshrined in 
EU law’ (paragraph 53);
• ‘facilitating the related work of the institutions 
and bodies, established by the 1998 
Agreement, in upholding human rights and 
equality standards’ (paragraph 53).
 
8. Possible Scenarios
8.1. The best outcome for ensuring ‘frictionless’ 
borders within the UK and between the UK and EU is for 
the UK, as a minimum, to remain in the Single Market and 
There is very limited prospect for a 
sector-by-sector approach to finding a 
UK-wide deal that avoids a hard Irish 
border. Under WTO rules, free trade 
agreements must cover substantially 
all trade and the EU has been 
consistent in stating that it will not 
offer sector-specific deals. 
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in a customs union with the EU. This, however, has been 
ruled out by the UK government, as acknowledged in the 
Joint Report. Nonetheless, if the UK were to change its 
stance on this, the EU would be likely to accommodate it. 
8.2. The worst outcome for Northern Ireland and 
(according to the Joint Report) the operation of the 1998 
Agreement is a ‘no deal’ scenario. This would mean that 
the UK would be obliged to impose customs controls 
on the movement of all goods according to WTO rules 
(assuming an agreement on terms is reached within the 
WTO), and would need to ensure that duties are paid 
and collected for goods crossing the Irish border. The EU 
would also have to enforce a hard customs border. This 
would mean, for example, that imports into Northern 
Ireland via Holyhead/Dublin, i.e. transiting through Ireland, 
would have to be customs-cleared twice. More generally, 
cooperation across the Irish border would be seriously 
compromised. 
8.3. Scenario 1 in the Joint Report is the one that the 
UK has set as its overarching aim: the future UK-EU trade 
deal is constructed in such a way as to allow for there to 
be no customs or other controls either down the Irish Sea 
or along the Irish border. The problem with this is that it 
is not possible to have a trade deal that manages to cover 
the commitments that the UK has entered into in the Joint 
Report while leaving the Customs Union and the Single 
Market. There would be a need for at least a customs 
border between the UK and the EU. 
8.4. If a UK-EU trade deal cannot guarantee a 
frictionless border, Scenario 2 envisages the UK proposing 
’specific solutions to address the unique circumstances 
of the island of Ireland’ (see 9 below). Subsequent 
paragraphs in the Joint Report assume that these solutions 
can be found and require that they will include necessary 
oversight mechanisms to ensure that the integrity of the 
EU’s Single Market and Customs Union is preserved. 
8.5. Scenario 3 is the one in which there are no ‘agreed 
solutions’ for Northern Ireland. In which case, the UK has 
stated that it ‘will maintain full alignment with those rules 
of the Internal Market and the Customs Union which, 
now or in the future, support North-South cooperation, 
the all-island economy and the protection of the 1998 
Agreement’. 
9. ‘Specific Solutions’ and ‘Distinct 
Arrangements’ for Northern Ireland
9.1. Scenario 2 envisages ‘specific solutions to address 
the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland’ and so 
potentially differentiated treatment of Northern Ireland. 
Under Scenario 3, although the UK Government states its 
wish to see ‘no new regulatory barriers’ between Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain, the Joint Report allows for the 
Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly to put in place 
‘distinct arrangements’ if they are necessary to uphold the 
1998 Agreement. 
9.2. The Joint Report does not offer any examples of 
‘specific solutions’ or ‘distinct arrangements’.
9.3. Differentiated treatment of Northern Ireland 
should not be regarded as something new. Within the UK, 
Northern Ireland is already treated in a more distinctive 
way than the other parts. This is exemplified in the 1998 
Agreement; core to this is the Irish government’s right of 
consultation in the affairs of Northern Ireland (guaranteed 
by the UK government since 1985). 
9.4. Any east/west differentiation would bear no 
weight on either the ‘integrity’ of the United Kingdom or 
Northern Ireland’s constitutional status. The latter can only 
be altered via the majority consent principle 
copper-fastened in UK and Irish constitutional law as well 
as in an international treaty – the 1998 Agreement – to 
which the UK and Ireland both remain bound. 
9.5. In order to implement any ‘solutions’ or 
‘arrangements’, Northern Ireland would most likely need 
the relevant competences ‘repatriated’ from the EU 
level to be devolved to Stormont. Maintaining alignment 
through Northern Ireland’s devolved responsibilities would 
require building technical and administrative capacity, and 
continued exercise of that responsibility by the Executive 
and Assembly. 
9.6. There would also have to be proper mechanisms 
by which the EU could be assured that regulatory 
alignment in Northern Ireland exists and remains 
rigorously enforced, including in the light of regulatory 
change within the EU. The monitoring and dispute 
resolutions could be built into the structures of the wider 
UK-EU future relationship.
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10. Barriers to Northern Ireland-Great Britain 
Movement in the Instance of Northern Ireland-
Specific Arrangements
10.1. The Joint Report notes that the UK continues to 
support fully Northern Ireland’s position as an ‘integral 
part’ of the UK. The support is repeated in the Prime 
Minister’s Commitments to Northern Ireland letter of 8 
December 2017.
10.2. West-to-east barriers, i.e. ones that affect the 
movement of people, goods and services from Northern 
Ireland to Great Britain (GB), are most unlikely. The UK 
government’s statement in the Joint Report that Northern 
Ireland businesses would retain ‘unfettered access’ to the 
UK market is reassuring in this respect. 
10.3. To the extent that the UK diverges from the EU 
in the future, it may be necessary for traded goods and 
services from Northern Ireland to meet two types of 
standards if they are to have frictionless access into the EU 
and GB markets. Along these lines, there have been some 
interesting proposals for Northern Ireland as a ‘special 
economic zone’ to allow its products to have Northern 
Ireland-specific designation. 
10.4. East-to-west flows (i.e. from GB to Northern 
Ireland) could face controls depending on the extent of the 
regulatory alignment between the UK and the EU.  
10.5. There are many examples of countries (e.g. United 
States) where there are internally different regulatory 
systems. Different customs regimes within countries are 
much rarer. One example of note is Hong Kong which 
operates its own autonomous customs regime separate 
from China’s.
11. Further Observations 
11.1. The Irish dimension to Brexit is the focus of a 
distinct strand of discussions during the second phase of 
the UK’s withdrawal negotiations. The strand is to ‘give 
effect to the principles and commitments set out in the 
Joint Report’. 
11.2. The EU has made it clear that progress in the 
Phase 2 discussions on the ‘future relationship’ will 
depend on the UK government giving legal effect to the 
commitments the UK has made in the Joint Report (e.g. 
‘to protecting and supporting North-South and East-West 
cooperation across the full range of political, economic, 
security, societal and agricultural contexts and frameworks 
of cooperation’ and ‘its guarantee of avoiding a hard 
border’). 
11.3. This effectively means that progress in Phase 2 
of negotiations will depend on clarity and consistency 
from the UK government in its plans for a future UK-EU 
relationship that will avoid the need for a hard border on 
or around the island of Ireland. 
11.4. With ‘full’ regulatory alignment, barriers to trade 
and cooperation across the Irish border will be minimised; 
there would also be no Northern Ireland-GB regulatory 
divergence except as already provided for under existing 
domestic legislation. 
11.5. Nonetheless, the Irish border will still become a 
harder border unless the UK is in a customs union with the 
EU, or it is ‘fully aligned’ to the rules of the EU’s customs 
union, or there is some specific customs arrangement for 
Northern Ireland. 
11.6. The planned transition arrangement – during 
which time the future trade relationship (and thus the 
necessity and nature of Irish border controls) will be 
decided – could see the status quo maintained, but only 
for a set period of time.
11.7. Regarding the final trade deal: unless framed as a 
strict EU-UK bilateral agreement (unlikely for one of such 
significance and anticipated scope), the final agreement 
will be a so-called ‘mixed’ agreement and so have to be 
approved and ratified by each one of the EU27 member 
states according to their own domestic constitutional 
requirements. The consent of the European Parliament will 
also be needed. Pending ratification, it is possible that the 
trade elements of the agreement could be implemented 
earlier through an ‘interim’ agreement, as is normal 
practice with ‘mixed’ agreements. 
11.8. At all stages of this process there will need to be 
absolute clarity as to the requirements for movement 
across the Irish border and the consequences for the UK’s 
commitments under the 1998 Agreement.
The Irish border will still become a 
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